A Problem for Guidance Control by Todd, Patrick & Tognazzini, Neal A.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Problem for Guidance Control
Citation for published version:
Todd, P & Tognazzini, NA 2008, 'A Problem for Guidance Control' The Philosophical Quarterly, vol 58, no.
233, pp. 685-692. DOI: 10.1111/phiq.2008.58.issue-233
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/phiq.2008.58.issue-233
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
The Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Todd, P., & Tognazzini, N. A. (2008). A Problem for Guidance Control. The Philosophical Quarterly, 58(233),
685-692. 10.1111/phiq.2008.58.issue-233
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
  
1 
A Problem for Guidance Control 
 
Penultimate Draft 
(final version in The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 233, (October 2008): 685-692) 
 
BY PATRICK TODD AND NEAL A. TOGNAZZINI 
 
In this paper, we raise a worry for the influential theory of moral responsibility put 
forth by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (hereafter, F&R). In particular, we 
argue for the possibility of a case in which an agent is intuitively not morally 
responsible despite satisfying the conditions for guidance control, which F&R claim 
is the sort of control central to moral responsibility. After presenting the 
counterexample, we consider various ways in which the account of guidance control 
may be mended. 
 
I. THE ELEMENTS OF GUIDANCE CONTROL 
 Before we can present the worry, however, we need to explain the basic structure 
and some of the details of F&R’s theory.1 F&R identify guidance control as the 
“freedom-relevant” condition on moral responsibility, and they spell it out as follows: 
(GC) An agent exercises guidance control of an action if and only if that action 
issues from the agent’s own, moderately reasons-responsive 
mechanism. 
 
The two crucial components of guidance control are ownership and responsiveness to 
reasons. But since our worry does not concern ownership, we need not discuss it here. 
We will focus instead on F&R’s analysis of the sort of reasons-responsiveness they 
think is required for moral responsibility: 
(MRR) An actually operative kind of mechanism is moderately reasons-
responsive if and only if: (1) it is at least regularly receptive to 
reasons, some of which are moral reasons, and (2) it is at least 
weakly reactive to reasons (but not necessarily moral reasons).2 
 
  
2 
Our worry targets F&R’s account of (MRR). In particular, we will present a case 
according to which some agent’s action issues from a mechanism that satisfies both 
(1) and (2) of (MRR), although we would intuitively judge the agent not to be morally 
responsible for the action. To understand our objection, then, it will help to dig a 
little deeper into F&R’s theory by looking closely at the distinction between 
receptivity and reactivity to reasons. 
Intuitively, to be receptive to reasons is to be able to recognize that certain 
facts about a particular situation are considerations either in favor or against taking a 
certain course of action. There are different degrees of receptivity to reasons, 
however. How should we specify the degree required for moral responsibility? F&R 
specify it as follows: 
(RRec) An actually operative kind of mechanism is regularly receptive to reasons 
if and only if: 
(1) There are possible scenarios in which (i) there is sufficient 
reason to do otherwise, (ii) the same kind of mechanism is 
operative, and (iii) the agent recognizes the sufficient reason to 
do otherwise, and 
(2) The possible scenarios described in (1) constitute an 
understandable pattern of reasons-recognition.3 
 
Let us remark briefly on both components. Receptivity is a modal property of 
mechanisms. To find out whether a particular kind of mechanism has this property, 
component (1) tells us that there must be counterfactual circumstances in which, 
holding fixed the kind of mechanism, the agent in question manages to recognize the 
sufficient reasons to do otherwise in that circumstance. So, to take a concrete 
example, suppose that your actually operative mechanism issues in your purchasing a 
ticket to the Los Angeles Philharmonic for $50. In order for us to conclude that your 
actually operative kind of mechanism satisfies (RRec), one thing we need to know is 
whether something like the following counterfactual is true: if the ticket were to 
have cost $5 million instead (and the same kind of mechanism were to have 
operated), you would have recognized that this fact is a sufficient reason not to buy 
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the ticket. The truth of this counterfactual will give us a world (or sphere of worlds) 
at which you are presented with sufficient reason to do otherwise, and you succeed 
in recognizing it. Thus your actually operative kind of mechanism is, in a weak sense 
at least, receptive to reasons. 
But more is required for (RRec) than one world at which you manage to 
recognize a sufficient reason to do otherwise. While this does amount to a sort of 
receptivity, it is not robust enough to ground moral responsibility. In particular, 
suppose that in addition to truth of the above counterfactual, the following 
counterfactual is true as well: if the ticket were to have cost $6 million instead (and 
the same kind of mechanism were to have operated), you would not have recognized 
that this fact is a sufficient reason not to buy the ticket. If we suppose that this 
counterfactual is also true, your mechanism begins to look quite mysterious indeed. 
Why would you recognize that $5 million is too much to pay for a ticket, but not 
recognize that $6 million is also too much? If you have no story to tell that would 
make this pattern of receptivity understandable, we should conclude that you are not 
in fact morally responsible for buying the ticket.4 
In order to get around this problem, F&R add clause (2) to their account of 
reasons-receptivity. Clause (2) specifies the regularity component of (RRec): the 
situations in which you would and would not recognize sufficient reason to do 
otherwise must constitute an understandable pattern. There can’t be any such 
oddities as recognizing that $5 million is too much, but not recognizing that $6 
million is too much. 
Let us now move to reasons-reactivity. An intuitive way to understand 
reactivity is, as F&R put it, in terms of a “capacity to translate reasons into choices 
(and then subsequent behavior)”.5 If I cannot translate reasons into action, then no 
matter how reasons-receptive my mechanism is, I cannot be appropriately held 
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morally responsible for what I do. We can spell out F&R’s account of reasons-
reactivity as follows: 
(WRea) An actually operative kind of mechanism is weakly reactive to 
reasons if and only if there is some possible scenario in which (1) 
there is sufficient reason to do otherwise, (2) the same kind of 
mechanism operates, (3) the agent recognizes the sufficient 
reason to do otherwise, and (4) the agent thus chooses and does 
otherwise for that reason.6 
 
Clause (4) is crucial here. The first three clauses pick out one of the worlds that tell 
us about the mechanism’s receptivity; if clause (4) is also satisfied at that world, then 
we know that the mechanism is appropriately reactive, as well.  
What makes this an account of weak reactivity to reasons is the fact that only 
one possible scenario is needed in which clauses (1) through (4) are satisfied. (Contrast 
this with (RRec), according to which there must be a suitable range of worlds in 
which the agent recognizes sufficient reason to do otherwise.) The reason for this is 
that reactivity is “all of a piece” in the following sense: “If the mechanism can react 
to any reason to do otherwise, it can react to all such reasons.”7 This contention will 
prove important for the critique we present below. 
F&R present a sophisticated and nuanced account of moral responsibility. 
Regularly reasons-receptivity and weak reasons-reactivity together constitute 
moderate reasons-responsiveness, which is one of the crucial components of 
guidance control, which itself is the freedom-relevant condition on moral 
responsibility. If an agent exercises guidance control of an action, and also satisfies 
the other conditions on moral responsibility (such as the epistemic condition), then 
the agent is morally responsible for that action. 
 
II. A PROBLEM FOR GUIDANCE CONTROL 
Now that we have sketched F&R’s theory of moral responsibility, we can turn to our 
worry. Briefly, the worry is that the following sort of situation seems possible: 
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(1) An agent performs a morally reprehensible action despite the existence of 
reasons not to perform it, 
(2) The kind of mechanism that actually issues in the reprehensible action is 
both regularly receptive to reasons and weakly reactive to reasons (as well 
as owned by the agent), and 
(3) The agent cannot recognize the actual reasons not to perform the action. 
 
If such a situation is possible, then F&R’s account of guidance control is in trouble, 
because whereas (2) amounts to the claim that the agent exercises guidance control 
of his morally reprehensible action, (3) should lead us to judge that the agent is not 
morally responsible for his action. After all, if there was no way the agent could have 
recognized the reason to do otherwise that actually existed, how is it fair to blame 
him for what he did? 
Let’s attempt to be a bit more concrete, however, by instantiating the 
abstract structure given above. Imagine an agent – call him ‘Tony’ – who actually 
slaps you across the face. Now, as a matter of fact, Tony has reason not to do this. In 
particular, the fact that it will cause you pain is a reason not to slap you. But let’s 
suppose that Tony cannot recognize that this fact is a reason not to slap you. That is, 
suppose that there is no possible world in which Tony’s actual kind of mechanism 
operates, and in which Tony recognizes that the fact that his slapping you will cause 
you pain is a reason not to do it. Whatever reasons-responsiveness Tony might 
exhibit in other contexts, the fact that he cannot recognize your pain as a reason not 
to slap you should, intuitively, lead us to judge that Tony is not morally responsible 
for slapping you. (One might worry that this judgment is incorrect if Tony is 
nevertheless acting on a morally reprehensible reason. That is, one might think that 
acting on a morally reprehensible reason is enough to secure moral responsibility 
despite an inability to see the reasons to do otherwise.8 Let us suppose, then, that 
when Tony slaps you, he’s not acting on any morally reprehensible reason, but merely 
to amuse his friend.) However, and here’s the important point, the mechanism that 
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actually issues in Tony’s slapping you might nevertheless be moderately reasons-
responsive. How? 
Recall that (MRR) comprises two components: regular reasons-receptivity 
and weak reasons-reactivity. Let’s take each in turn to see how Tony’s mechanism 
might satisfy it. For Tony’s mechanism to be regularly receptive to reasons, there 
must be possible circumstances, which together constitute an understandable 
pattern, in which there is some sufficient reason to do otherwise and in which Tony 
recognizes this reason. To see how this requirement might be satisfied, we just need 
to make Tony a bit weirder. For some inexplicable reason, you are special to Tony. 
Whereas Tony cannot recognize your pain as a reason not to slap you, he can 
perfectly well recognize Jessica’s pain as a reason not to slap her, and Brian’s pain as a 
reason not to slap him, and so on for every other agent. It’s just that his recognitional 
capacities are for some reason blocked with respect to you. If that’s right, then there 
will presumably be plenty of counterfactual circumstances in which Tony’s 
mechanism is receptive to reasons to do otherwise. Moreover, there seems to be no 
reason to suppose that these circumstances do not constitute an understandable 
pattern. After all, even F&R point out that we can’t expect perfection when it comes 
to receptivity. They say: “Of course, the regularity [of reasons-receptivity] need not 
be absolute; the mechanism must simply evince some suitable degree of regularity. 
Everyone makes some mistakes, and it is a matter of judgment precisely how much 
regularity is appropriate to require.”9 But if the regularity need not be absolute, then 
our case of Tony seems perfectly possible. 
Reactivity is an even easier case. All we need is for there to be one possible 
circumstance in which the same kind of mechanism operates and in which Tony 
recognizes sufficient reason to do otherwise and succeeds in translating this reason 
into action. Nothing about Tony’s local inability with respect to recognition appears 
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to affect his ability to translate reasons into action. Indeed, we can suppose that in at 
least one world in which he is confronted with the fact that slapping Jessica will 
cause her pain, not only does he recognize this as reason not to slap her, but he also 
refrains from slapping her for this reason.  So it looks like Tony’s mechanism may 
well be weakly reasons-reactive, as well. 
But now we have arrived at a case that looks like a counterexample to F&R’s 
account of guidance control. Tony acts from his own moderately reasons-responsive 
mechanism and yet, due to his local inability to recognize your pain as a reason not 
to slap you, we are inclined to judge that he is not morally responsible for slapping 
you. 
We said above that F&R’s claim about reactivity’s being “all of a piece” is 
relevant to our criticism, and we are now in a position to see why. Since reactivity is 
all of a piece, all we need to know in order to conclude that Tony’s mechanism is able 
to react to the actually present reason is that there is some world in which it reacts to 
some sufficient reason to do otherwise. It is thus impossible, on F&R’s account, for 
there to be local deficiencies in reactivity. But they do not claim that receptivity is “all 
of a piece”. In fact, they make the stronger claim that there is a crucial asymmetry 
between receptivity and reactivity on this very issue. It is this asymmetry that leaves 
room for local deficiencies in receptivity, and thus makes their account vulnerable to 
the sort of counterexample we have presented. 
 
III. A POSSIBLE RESPONSE 
It is worth considering one way that F&R may be tempted to respond to our 
counterexample. Recall that regular reasons-receptivity requires a range of possible 
scenarios that together constitute an understandable pattern. With this in mind, F&R 
might claim that their account does deliver the intuitively correct verdict that Tony is 
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not morally responsible since Tony’s recognitional capacities are incoherent. As we 
have described the case, Tony suffers from a local inability with respect to 
recognition. While he can recognize that other people’s pain is a reason not to slap 
them, he cannot recognize that your pain is a reason not to slap you. But this seems 
very odd. F&R might claim that any agent who exhibits this odd constellation of 
recognitional abilities does not act from a mechanism that is regularly reasons-
receptive. In this way, they could deny that Tony is morally responsible. 
The problem with this, however, is that it commits F&R to the claim that any 
situation in which that mechanism is operative is a situation in which Tony is not 
morally responsible for his action. This means that even in a world where Tony slaps 
Jessica (instead of you), he will not be morally responsible for doing so, despite the 
fact that he is able to recognize (and, we can suppose, in fact does recognize) that 
Jessica’s pain is a reason not to slap her. This is also an intuitively incorrect result. 
The mere fact that Tony is unable to recognize your pain (and only yours) as a reason 
should not entail that he is not morally responsible in situations where he does 
recognize someone’s pain as mattering. 
In sum, the case of Tony presents F&R with the following dilemma. Either 
the pattern of Tony’s receptivity is understandable, or it isn’t. If it is, then according 
to F&R, Tony will be morally responsible for slapping you, despite the fact that he 
can’t recognize that causing you pain is a reason not to slap you. If it isn’t, then Tony 
won’t be morally responsible for slapping Jessica, Brian, Sally, and so on, despite the 
fact that he can and does recognize that causing them pain is a reason not to slap 
them. Either way, F&R’s account leads to an intuitively incorrect result. Hence, the 
case of Tony constitutes a counterexample to their account. 
We do not think that our argument provides decisive reason to abandon their 
theory altogether, however, because there are a number of ways that F&R might 
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patch up their account. In the remainder of this paper, we will consider three 
possible fixes. 
 
IV. PATCH #1: RECEPTIVITY IS “ALL OF A PIECE” 
Perhaps the most straightforward way for F&R to avoid the counterexample we have 
presented would be simply to argue that both reactivity and receptivity are “all of a 
piece”. Recall that our counterexample turned crucially on the following two claims: 
(1) There is a suitable range of possible scenarios in which Tony recognizes sufficient 
reason to do otherwise, and (2) Tony cannot recognize the actual sufficient reason to 
do otherwise. Making receptivity “all of a piece” would solve this problem, because 
the truth of the first claim would entail the falsity of the second. 
 This route has costs. First, F&R’s “all of a piece” claim with respect to 
reactivity has been widely criticized by commentators, who will no doubt think that 
adding the same claim with respect to receptivity is equally unappealing.10 Moreover, 
in recent work Fischer has argued that the fundamentals of their theory can survive 
jettisoning the controversial claim that reactivity is “all of a piece”.11 It would be 
undesirable, then, if F&R had to introduce the claim that receptivity is “all of a 
piece” in order to save their account of guidance control. Finally, even if one thinks 
that the claim about reactivity is plausible, the claim about receptivity seems less so. 
Do we really want to say that it’s impossible for someone to have a patch of local 
blindness with respect to what reasons he can recognize? 
 
V. PATCH #2: RECEPTIVITY IS “PART OF A PIECE” 
 Of course, instead of insisting on receptivity’s being “all of a piece”, F&R 
might instead say that receptivity is only “part of a piece”. That is, they might claim 
that whereas it is not in general true that the ability to recognize some reason entails 
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the ability to recognize any reason, what is true is that when the reasons in question 
are of the same type (for instance, when they are about causing pain), the ability to 
recognize one reason of that type entails the ability to recognize any reason of that 
type. Recall that Tony recognizes that everyone’s pain but yours is a reason not to 
slap him or her; he just doesn’t recognize that your pain is a reason not to slap you. 
On this weaker “part of a piece” claim, F&R could maintain that this description of 
Tony is impossible, since it just doesn’t make sense to suppose that someone could 
have a local inability in receptivity within a particular type of reason. Perhaps agents 
could be blind to whole classes of reasons, but within a particular class of reasons, it 
is impossible that an agent be able to recognize some members of that class but not 
others. 
 We think this “part of a piece” claim has considerable intuitive appeal. To see 
why, suppose that your friend breaks a promise to Jim and, when confronted about 
it, claims that he sees he shouldn’t have done what he did because it constituted the 
breaking of a promise to Jim. But then suppose that your friend breaks a promise to 
Jill and, when confronted about it, claims that he can’t see how his action’s breaking 
a promise to Jill was a reason not to do it. The proper response to this friend, it 
seems, is to insist that either he can see the reason with respect to Jill (and he is just 
being obstinate) or that he was mistaken (or lying) about what he was able to see 
yesterday with respect to Jim. It seems implausible to suppose he sees it in one case 
but not in another that doesn’t differ in any relevant way. 
 Unfortunately, however, adding this “part of a piece” claim to F&R’s account 
fails to solve the fundamental problem, since we can simply reconstruct the 
counterexample at the level of types of reason.12 That is, we can imagine a case in 
which Tony is blind to every instance of a particular type of reason (say, pain-based 
reasons) even though Tony is able to recognize instances of every other type of 
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reason. Now put Tony in a situation according to which the only reason to do 
otherwise is an instance of the type to which Tony is blind. If Tony acts contrary to 
this reason, he is intuitively not morally responsible for what he does, since he could 
not have recognized the reason in question. However, the mechanism on which he 
acts still seems suitably sensitive and understandable (and hence regularly receptive 
to reasons), since it is receptive to every other type of reason except the one in 
question, and (as F&R agree) we can’t require perfection when it comes to 
receptivity. 
 
VI. PATCH #3: RECEPTIVITY TO THE ACTUAL REASON 
We will consider one final way to fix the account of guidance control. The real 
problem with the case of Tony is that he is unable to recognize the actually sufficient 
reason to do otherwise, and hence seems not to be morally responsible. An adequate 
account of reasons-receptivity, then, needs to require at least that the agent be able 
to recognize the actual sufficient reason to do otherwise. After all, when we are 
assessing an agent’s moral responsibility, we should look at more than just whether 
the mechanism that issues in the action is functioning properly in some abstract 
sense; we should also look at whether the mechanism is appropriately connected to 
the actual circumstances. While (RRec) and (WRea) tell us when a mechanism is 
functioning properly in the abstract, they don’t connect up to the actual 
circumstances.  
So instead of revising (RRec), we need a supplementary property of the 
mechanism in question. It must be regularly receptive to reasons, weakly reactive to 
reasons, and, let’s say, receptive to the actual reason: 
(RAR) An actually operative kind of mechanism is receptive to the actual reason 
if and only if there is a world in which the same mechanism operates 
and the same sufficient reason to do otherwise is present and the agent 
recognizes the sufficient reason to do otherwise.  
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If we add (RAR) to F&R’s account of moderate reasons-responsiveness and guidance 
control, then the case of Tony is no longer troubling. Since his mechanism doesn’t 
satisfy (RAR) with respect to his slapping you, he is not morally responsible for what 
he does.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented a counterexample to F&R’s account of guidance 
control that exploits a local blindness in reasons-receptivity. After presenting the 
counterexample, we considered three ways to mend the account of guidance control: 
claiming that receptivity is “all of a piece”, claiming that receptivity is “part of a 
piece”, and requiring receptivity to the actual reason. We conclude that the best way 
to fix F&R’s account of guidance control is to supplement it by requiring receptivity 
to the actual reason.13 
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